Investment rigidity and policy measures by Serra, Teresa et al.




 b, José M. Gil
a, and Allen Featherstone
 c  
aCentre de Recerca en Economia i Desenvolupament Agroalimentari (CREDA-UPC-IRTA) 
bAgricultural Economics and Rural Sociology Deparment, Pennsylvania State University 
c Department of Agricultural Economics, Kansas State University 
*Corresponding author. Parc Mediterrani de la Tecnologia, Edifici ESAB, Avinguda del Canal Olímplic s/n, 08860 
Castelldefels, SPAIN. Tel.: +34935521209; Fax: +34935521121. E-mail address: serra@are.berkeley.edu 
 
 
Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the American Agricultural Economics 





This paper assesses the impacts of decoupled government transfers on production decisions of a sample of 
Kansas farms observed from 1996 to 2001. Our model allows for risk, risk attitudes and the intertemporal 
investment decisions. We also allow for different adjustments of the decision variables depending on the 
predominant economic conditions. The theoretical model is estimated using the threshold regression methods 
proposed by Hansen (1999). Threshold effects are allowed to characterize the behavior of output supply and 
quasi-fixed and variable input demand.. The econometric results support the existence of three regimes 
characterized by different economic behavior. Our analysis suggests that in a dynamic setting with risk and 
non-risk neutral economic agents, decoupled transfers can have a powerful influence on decisions taken by 
economic agents. The dynamics of the stock of capital cause this influence to grow over time. 
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With the proliferation of decoupled instruments over the last two decades as a key element 
in agricultural policy formulation in developed countries, several studies seek to assess the 
impacts of these instruments on farmers’ decisions. Published work in this area considers the 
three chief mechanisms through which policy measures can affect agricultural production.  
The first group contains papers studying the partially decoupled area payments 
introduced in the European Union (EU) by the 1992 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
reform, focusing on the static effects of policy under risk neutrality. In this scenario, policies 
will only impact on farmers’ economic decisions as long as they alter relative market prices. 
Papers within this group include Guyomard, Baudry and Carpentier (1996), Moro and 
Sckokai (1999) and Serra et al. (2005) and have generally used a conventional theoretical 
framework approach that assumes perfect markets and risk neutral producers.  
Price-neutral policies can also influence production in a static framework with  risk 
averse economic agents, by means of altering price or revenue uncertainty and exogenous 
income. A more recent avenue of research on decoupling has explicitly allowed for risk and 
risk preferences (Sckokai and Moro, 2006; Serra et al., 2006). This literature generally builds 
upon Sandmo’s (1971) seminal paper that shows that lump sum transfers, by means of 
altering farm household wealth, can affect individuals’ risk preferences and their economic 
decisions.  
More incipient is the literature considering the dynamic effects of policy. Farm 
output is a function of different inputs including the level of capital, which depends on past   2
decisions on investments. To the extent that lump sum transfers can alter investment 
demand, the effects of decoupled policies on production may play a more important role in a 
dynamic setting. The latter constitutes a third mechanism through which agricultural policy 
can affect economic decisions, i.e., through the dynamic investment response, which will 
have long-lasting impacts on production. Our paper will focus on assessing this dynamic 
response. 
As detailed in the investment literature, in a world with perfect capital markets, 
statically decoupled payments are not likely to influence a farm’s capital stock. However, in 
the presence of capital market imperfections such as binding constraints, decoupled 
payments may have the effect of stimulating farm investments, which will carry their output 
effects into future years. The literature on this topic has been very scarce. The papers by 
Sckokai (2005) and Coyle (2005) constitute two notable exceptions. Following the modern 
theory on investment under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck 1994), which recognizes the 
importance of uncertainties related to future market conditions in the decision to invest, 
Sckokai (2005) not only assesses the dynamic investment effects, but also allows for some 
degree of uncertainty affecting production and investment decision choices. Our model 
builds upon the framework proposed by Sckokai (2005). 
In line with the typical classical dynamic setting, the incipient literature on the effects 
of decoupling on investment decisions has assumed convex investment costs that allow 
quasi-fixed inputs to adjust smoothly over time to their optimal level, where the shadow 
value of capital equals its marginal adjustment costs (Lucas, 1967; Rothschild, 1971). 
Irregularities in the adjustment cost function however, may prevent firms from adjusting to 
changing market conditions. Following Abel and Eberly (1994) and extending previous 
literature on decoupling, we allow for these irregularities by specifying threshold-type   3
behavior. The theoretical model, which also allows for some degree of uncertainty and risk 
preferences is estimated using the threshold regression procedure proposed by Hansen 
(1999). 
Our empirical analysis focuses on assessing the impacts of the extensive reform that 
the US farm policy underwent in 1996. The reform was embodied in the 1996 Federal 
Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act and involved a reduction in the coupled 
element of income support. Price supports were cut and the negative effects of price 
changes on farmers’ incomes were compensated by production flexibility contract (PFC) 
payments that did not require the production of certain crops and were not linked to actual 
production or prices, and by a deficiency payment that guaranteed a minimum support price 
for program crops. Our objective is to determine the dynamic investment effects of PFC 
payments using farm-level data from the Kansas Farm Management Association dataset.  
 
The Model and Estimation Methods 
We focus on the dynamic intertemporal duality theory due to McLaren and Cooper (1980) 
and Epstein (1981). The literature that studies agricultural investment decisions under a 
dynamic framework has generally imposed rather restrictive assumptions on risk and risk 
preferences. Some analyses have completely ignored risk and attitudes towards risk (for 
example, Epstein and Denny, 1983; Vasavada and Chambers, 1986). More recent 
developments have allowed for nonstatic price expectations and risk though assuming risk 
neutral economic agents (see Luh and Stefanou, 1996; and Pietola and Myers, 2000). Sckokai 
(2005) has allowed for risk and risk preferences. We extend the dual model of investment 
under uncertainty developed by Sckokai (2005) to a consideration of irregularities in the 
capital stock adjustment cost function.    4
We assume that farmers are risk averse. Specifically, we suppose constant relative risk 
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where,  0 A  is a farm’s initial wealth,  x is the quantity used of a variable input which can be 
adjusted at no cost, k  represents the units of capital, w is the variable input price, c  is the 
capital rental price and S  measures decoupled payments. Variable  (,,) yf x k Ie =+  
represents a farm’s single output production function, e  is an error term with mean zero 
and finite variance, and  I  is the capital investment variable. Output supply is assumed to be 
a stochastic variable with mean  y  and variance 
2
y σ  . The market output price  p is also 
assumed to be a random variable that is independently distributed from the production 
disturbance with mean  p and variance 
2
p σ . Expression  0   AA p yw xc kS = +− − +  is the 
expected farm’s wealth, being 
22 22 22 2
A py p y yp σ σσ σ σ =++ the farm’s profit variance. While 
we consider price and output uncertainty within a period, we do not allow for the inter-
temporal dimension of risk. Static expectations are thus assumed for both price and output 
in the sense that they are formulated within each period given present conditions without 
any dynamic consideration. It is only when the period changes that new expectations can be 
formulated if previous ones are not optimal (Sckokai, 2005; Howard and Shumway, 1998).   5
Under the assumption that farmers are risk averse and take their decisions with the 
aim of maximizing the discounted utility over an infinite horizon, subject to the transition 
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k  is the time derivative of the capital path and r  is the interest rate. The Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation corresponding to the optimization program is: 
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where the subscripts denote derivatives. The first derivatives of expression (3) with respect 
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represents the change in utility levels if 
farm’s wealth is increased by means of lump-sum transfers.  
  The system of equations in (4) investigates investment and disinvestment decisions 
in a typical classical dynamic setting. The classical theory of investment assumes that the cost 
of investment can be represented by a strictly convex function that allows quasi-fixed inputs 
to adjust smoothly over time to their optimal level (Lucas, 1967; Rothschild, 1971). 
Irregularities in the adjustment cost function however, may prevent firms from adapting to 
changing market conditions.  
Considering these irregularities, Abel and Eberly (1994) propose an augmented 
adjustment cost function that allows for differences between the purchase and resale asset 
prices, asymmetries in fixed capital adjustment costs, and a kink of the conventional 
adjustment cost function at its origin. Within this framework, capital investment is a non-
decreasing function of the asset’s shadow price ( k J ). However, it does follow a threshold-
type behavior characterized by a lower and an upper critical values of the shadow price. 
Optimal gross investment is expected to be positive (negative) for shadow prices above 
(below) the upper (lower) threshold. For shadow prices in the range comprised between the 
two thresholds, capital may not adjust (or may adjust more slowly) to exogenous shocks.   
  Boetel, Hoffmann and Liu (2007) have used a threshold regression procedure to 
empirically implement Abel and Eberly (1994) theoretical proposal. More specifically, they 
estimate the system of first-order conditions in two steps. In a first stage the investment 
demand is estimated following the method proposed by Hansen (1996, 1999, 2000). The 
output supply and variable input demand equations are estimated in a second stage by 
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) method.    7
  Because output supply is a function of different inputs including the capital stock, 
nonlinearities in capital adjustment to its long-run equilibrium may be easily translated to the 
output supply and variable input demand equations. For example, output supply may 
experience quicker adjustments in those regimes where capital adjusts at a fast path than in 
those regimes where capital stock is more constant. Consistent with this argument, we allow 
for the threshold-type behavior in all equations of the system of first order conditions.   
Further, we estimate the system simultaneously to avoid inefficiencies in the estimation 
process. In doing so, we extend and improve Boetel, Hoffman and Liu (2007) empirical 
approach.  
  From (4) one can derive an empirical counterpart for the output supply and input 
demand equations by assigning a mathematical specification to function  J . This however 
will result in a nonlinear system of equations that would render the implementation of 
threshold regression methods too difficult. These methods generally assume that while a 
variable adjusts differently (nonlinearly) across regimes, it follows a linear adjustment within 
each regime. We thus estimate a reduced-form of the equations of the system. In this 
reduced-form, the optimal output supply and input demand equations are expressed as: 
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where  g  is the vector of decision variables being analyzed and  x is the vector of 
explanatory variables. According to the theoretical model above, vector  x is assumed to be 
composed by  ()
2
01 σ − = A x r,A ,p,w,c,S, ,k .  ( ) I. is an indicator function which takes the value 
of one if the condition inside the parenthesis is met and zero otherwise. Because the shadow   8
value of the quasi-fixed input, i.e.,  k J  is not observable, we assume that there exists a 
mapping between the shadow value and the lagged value of the net farm income. The upper 
and lower thresholds are represented by 
u
k J  and 
l
k J  respectively.
1  ε  is the vector of iid 
errors.  
  The econometric methods that we follow to estimate the system in (5) are described 
in Hansen (1996, 1999, 2000). More specifically, we use sequential conditional iterated SUR 
in two steps. In the first stage a grid search is carried out to estimate the threshold 
parameters 
l
k J  and 
u
k J . The lower threshold is searched over the minimum and median of 
the lagged net farm income, while the upper threshold is searched over the range that goes 
from the median to the maximum value of the lagged net farm income. The search is 
restricted to ensure an adequate number of observations in each regime. For a given pair 
( )
lu
kk J ,J , regression coefficients can be estimated through the OLS regression of  g  on  x 
for each subsample.  From this estimation the logarithm of the determinant of the variance-
covariance matrix of the residuals Σ is derived:  ( ) ( )
lu lu
kk kk ˆ SJ, J l n J, J =Σ , being  ()
lu
kk ˆ J ,J Σ  a 
multivariate least squares estimate of  ( ) ε ∑=var  conditional upon 
l
k J  and 
u
k J . 
  In the second stage of the estimation process, the least squares estimate of ( )
lu
kk J ,J  
is obtained by minimizing function  ( )
lu
kk SJ, J , which is equivalent to maximizing a 
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significance of the differences in parameters across regimes, we use the likelihood ratio 
proposed by Hansen (1999). Since this test does not follow a standard distribution, its value 
                                                 
1 Other approximations to the shadow value were tried. Selecting the output price as in Chavas (1994) or 
Boetel, Hoffmann and Liu (2007) would produce similar results.   9
is compared against the critical values derived from the bootstrap procedure outlined in 




The model is estimated using farm-level data for a sample of Kansas farms observed from 
1996 to 2001 corresponding to the implementation of the FAIR Act. Micro data are derived 
from the Kansas Farm Management Association database. Aggregate data are also used to 
define those variables unavailable at the farm-level. Country-level price indices and state-
level output prices and quantities are taken from the National Agricultural Statistics Service 
(NASS). The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) provides state-level 
marketing assistance loan rates and PFC payment rates. The Federal Reserve provides data 
on the federal funds rate.  
Our analysis concentrates on those farms specialized in the production of the most 
relevant crops in Kansas, i.e., wheat, corn, grain sorghum and soybeans. In this regard, we 
only consider those farms whose sales of the four crops represent at least 80% of total sales. 
We define a single output category ( y ) that aggregates the production (in bushels) of wheat, 
corn, grain sorghum, and soybeans. Because our database does not explicitly contain 
information on market prices, we use price indices as a proxy. Specifically, we build an 
output Paasche price index by using state-level production data and state-level prices. The 
expected output price is made equal to the lagged price index. 
The aggregate variable input includes the use of pesticides and insecticides, fertilizer, 
seed, gas-fuel-oil, and irrigation energy. The input price w is measured using a national 
aggregate input price index. Variable input level,  x, is defined as an implicit quantity index.   10
Capital is aggregated into a single variable k  incorporating vehicles, machinery and 
buildings. By using real estate and machinery price indices,
2 a quantity index of available 
capital is derived.  The rental price for capital is computed by assuming that the current asset 
price can be derived as a continuously discounted sum of all future rents on the depreciated 
asset (see Epstein and Denny, 1983; and Pietola and Myers, 2000). According to this 
assumption, the rental price of capital can be computed as  ( ) cr z δ =+ , where c  is the rental 
price,  r  is the interest rate corresponding to the annual federal funds interest rate, δ  is the 
capital depreciation rate which is computed at the data means, and  z is the capital price 
index.  
The Kansas database does not register PFC government payments. In its place, a 
single measure including all government payments received by each farm is available. We 
estimate farm-level PFC payments by approximating the acreage of the program crops (base 
acreage) and the base yield for each crop using farm-level data. The approximation uses the 
1986-1988 average acreage and yield for each program crop and farm and permits 
construction of a balanced panel of 154 farms.  PFC payments per crop are computed by 
multiplying 0.85 by the base acreage, yield, and the PFC payment rate. PFC payments per 
crop are then added to get total direct payments per farm. This estimate is compared to 
actual government payments received by each farm. If estimated PFC payments exceed 
actual payments, the first measure is replaced by the second.  
Initial wealth  0 A  is computed as the lagged value of a farm’s total assets (excluding 
the lagged capital stock already measured by k ). The standard deviation of wealth  A σ  is 
approximated at the farm-level by the standard deviation of a farm’s sales. The value of the 
                                                 
2 These indices are weighted according to the relevance of each component in the capital variable computed 
at the data means.   11
net farm income is computed as the difference between the value of farm production and 
operating expenses and depreciation. Its lagged value is taken as the threshold variable. The 
system of first order conditions is estimated as described above.  
Some details pertaining to the empirical estimation are described here. Following 
Boetel, Hoffmann and Liu (2007) and to conserve degrees of freedom, we allow only the 
parameters associated with the lagged stock of capital to vary across the three regimes. 
Second, all prices are normalized by the capital rental price in the interest of parsimony. 
Finally, the variance of wealth is normalized by the square of the difference between farm’s 
assets and liabilities in the system in (4).  
The point estimates of the two thresholds and their asymptotic 95% confidence 
intervals are reported in table 1. The lower threshold is 23,511 and the upper equals 55,617, 
thus corresponding to small and large lagged returns to unpaid labor, management and 
equity. These thresholds separate firms into three different groups: those receiving low 
returns, the ones with intermediate returns and the group benefiting from the highest net 
farm income. The intermediate income regime concentrates 224 observations, while the 
lower and upper regimes have 365 and 335 observations respectively. The null hypothesis of 
no threshold against the alternative of two thresholds is tested using the likelihood ratio test 
proposed by Hansen (1999) which allows to comfortably reject  the null.
3 
The regression slope parameter estimates and their standard errors are also offered in 
table 1. As noted above, we allow for one regime-dependent variable, the lagged stock of 
capital. The regime-varying coefficients in the investment demand equation take values 
comprised between -1 and 0, implying that capital adjusts to its long-run equilibrium. These 
coefficients are all statistically significant and differ across regimes. The lowest value 
                                                 
3 The null of one threshold against two thresholds was also tested and rejected (with a p-value of 0.04). 
Finally the null of zero versus one threshold was also rejected (p-value = 0.00).   12
corresponds to the central regime, while the highest is associated to the low income regime. 
This involves, as expected, that capital is adjusted at a higher speed when the lagged net farm 
income is more extreme than when it takes intermediate values.  
The regime-dependent coefficients in the output supply equation are also statistically 
significant and suggest that increases in output as a response to an increase in capital stock 
are bigger in the higher income regimes where capital levels are higher. On the contrary, in 
the most unfavorable regime where capital levels are lower, increases in capital stock exert 
the smallest impact on output levels. This suggests increasing returns to capital stock. Finally, 
the variable input demand seems to increase faster with increasing capital levels as the 
economic conditions improve.  
With regards to the regime-independent variables, a majority of coefficients are 
statistically significant and have the expected sign. The positive coefficient on the expected 
output price in all three equations suggests that an increase in the profitability of production 
causes an increase to both (variable and quasi-fixed) input demand and output supply. Our 
results suggest that changes in market interest rates do not exert statistically significant 
impacts on production decisions.   
Of interest is the coefficient on decoupled payments, which is positive and 
statistically different from zero in all three equations. As noted above, decoupled payments 
can impact production levels through risk effects and also through dynamic effects. The 
coefficient on initial wealth, which is positive in all three equations, suggests the importance 
of risk effects. It is widely accepted that an agent’s degree of risk aversion decreases with 
wealth (Sandmo, 1971; Hennessy, 1998). Hence, wealthier farmers, in being less risk averse, 
are likely to be more prone to expand their business size. In that decoupled payments 
contribute to enhance wealth, they will also lead to increasing output supply and input   13
demand. Dynamic effects of payments should be relevant as lump sum transfers motivate 
capital investments. This hypothesis is confirmed below with the computation of the 
elasticities of output and inputs with respect to policy instruments. The coefficients on the 
variance of sales have the expected negative sign, but are not statistically significant.  
In order to have a better gasp of the workings of the output supply/input demand 
system and to better assess the impacts of policy reform, we determine the sensitivity of the 
decision variables with respect to decoupled payments and for comparison purposes, output 
prices. As in Boetel, Hoffmann and Liu (2007), ours is a dynamic recursive system due to the 
inclusion of the lagged stock of capital as an explanatory variable. The elasticities are derived 
at the data means for all three regimes for different lengths of run. More specifically, to 
derive the base-scenario, the system of equations is solved forcing the solution to be in each 
regime alternatively and holding the explanatory variables at their mean levels. Once we have 
the regime-dependent solution, we increase decoupled payments by 5% and the solution to 
the system is re-computed. A comparison of the quantities in the base scenario with those 
derived after the shock allow to compute the elasticities for different time periods. The same 
operation is repeated to assess the impacts of a shock to output prices. Results are presented 
in tables 2 and 3. 
With the exception of the output price elasticity in the long-run, empirical results 
show that both price and payment elasticities are inelastic both in the short and long-run. 
Payment elasticities are found to be small relative to price elasticities, a result which is 
compatible with previous research (Hennessy 1998; Sckokai, 2005; Serra et al., 2006). For 
example, after 10 years of a permanent 5% increase in output prices, all decision variables 
increase between 4.4% and 5.3%. However, a permanent 5% increase in decoupled 
payments is only capable of stimulating an increase in capital stock of around 1% and an   14
increase in output supply and variable input demand between 1.9% and 3.0%. The 
differences between the effects of a price and a payment shock become more relevant over 
time, suggesting that output price dynamic effects are more powerful than payment effects.  
I t  i s  a l s o  n o t e w o r t h y  t h a t  w h i l e  p a y m e n t impacts are small relative to the price 
impacts, they are higher than the ones reported by previous analyses that have ignored the 
dynamic investment response (see Serra et al., 2006; Moro and Sckokai, 1999). Both payment 
and price elasticities increase over time as a result of the dynamic effects. Price elasticities 
experience considerable increases within the ten-year period studied (investment demand 
elasticities increase sixfold, while output supply and variable input demand elasticities 
experience increases between 50-100%). Investment demand payment elasticities experience 
similar increases as price elasticities. Output and variable input payment elasticities   
experience milder but worth mentioning increases. 
Capital stock elasticities suggest that adjustment is quicker for the extreme regimes 
than for the central one. This result is compatible with parameter estimates presented in 
table 1 and with findings in Boetel, Hoffmann and Liu (2007).  
 
Concluding remarks 
This paper assesses the impacts of decoupled government transfers on production decisions 
of a sample of Kansas farms observed from 1996 to 2001. Our model allows for risk, risk 
attitudes and the intertemporal investment decisions. We also allow for different adjustments 
of the decision variables depending on the predominant economic conditions. In each 
period, farmers are assumed to simultaneously choose the dynamics of the stock of capital, 
output levels and variable input demand. The theoretical model is estimated using the   15
threshold regression methods proposed by Hansen (1999). Threshold effects are allowed to 
characterize the behavior of output supply and quasi-fixed and variable input demand.  
  The econometric results support the existence of three regimes characterized by 
different economic behavior. A first group includes firms receiving a low return to unpaid 
labor, management and equity, firms receiving an intermediate income belong to the second 
group, being the third group composed by firms receiving the highest income. Firms in the 
central regime have the slowest capital adjustments, while those in the more extreme ones 
adjust capital stock at a quicker rate.  
In order to determine the impacts of decoupled payments on production decisions, 
we compute the elasticities of the decision variables with respect to these payments and, for 
comparison purposes, output prices. Our analysis suggests that in a dynamic setting with risk 
and non-risk neutral economic agents, decoupled transfers can have a powerful influence on 
decisions taken by economic agents. The dynamics of the stock of capital cause this 
influence to grow over time. 
Compatible with previous research, the impacts of subsidies on output levels and 
input use are found to be considerably smaller than the effect of output prices. Interestingly, 
these differences are found to increase over time, suggesting that prices have stronger 
dynamic effects than payments. It is also noteworthy that while payment impacts are small 
relative to the price impacts, they are higher than the ones reported by previous analyses that 
have ignored the dynamic investment response (see Serra et al., 2006; Moro and Sckokai, 
1999). 
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Table 1. Parameter estimates for the system of first-order conditions      
Variable Investment  demand  Output supply  Variable input demand 













































































R-squared 0.08 0.640  0.583
Threshold  Estimate  95% confidence intervals 
Lower  23,511 -17,989 – 33,511
Upper  55,617 39,617 – 191,117
LR test  70.579
(0.000)  20
Table 2. Elascities under the different investment regimes: Permanent 5% output price increase 
Period  Investment demand  Output supply  Input demand 
  Reg 1  Reg 2  Reg3  Reg 1  Reg 2  Reg3  Reg 1  Reg 2  Reg3 
1
st 0.757  0.729 0.734 3.439 2.961 2.793 2.708 2.851 2.423
2
nd    1.436  1.362 1.375 3.718 3.245 3.109 3.033 3.103 2.748
3
rd   2.046  1.917 1.940 3.971 3.503 3.397 3.328 3.335 3.044
4
rth 2.595  2.407 2.441 4.201 3.740 3.659 3.595 3.548 3.313
5
th   3.090  2.843 2.887 4.410 3.957 3.899 3.837 3.744 3.559
10
th 4.933  4.439 4.529 5.201 4.812 4.833 4.754 4.524 4.519
 
Table 3. Elascities under the different investment regimes: Permanent 5% decoupled payments increase 
Period  Investment demand  Output supply  Input demand 
  Reg 1  Reg 2  Reg3  Reg 1  Reg 2  Reg3  Reg 1  Reg 2  Reg3 
1
st 0.170  0.163 0.165 2.645 2.278 2.148 1.794 1.889 1.605
2
nd    0.322  0.306 0.309 2.701 2.305 2.188 1.862 1.921 1.656
3
rd   0.459  0.430 0.435 2.752 2.330 2.225 1.924 1.950 1.703
4
rth 0.582  0.540 0.548 2.798 2.353 2.258 1.980 1.977 1.745
5
th   0.693  0.638 0.648 2.840 2.374 2.288 2.030 2.001 1.784
10
th   1.107  0.996 1.016 2.998 2.457 2.406 2.222 2.100 1.935
 